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EXTERNAL DEBT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY
ABSTRACT
Thispaper studies theoretically and empirically the role of
domestic political incentives in the accumulation of large
external debts by developing countries during 1972-81. The
theoretical model characterizes two equilibrium regimes. In one
regime the borrower is on its demand curve and changes in the
loan size demand are accommodated by the lenders. In the other
regime the borrower is credit rationed, and the loan size is
determined by the perceived country risk. Higher political
instability increases the equilibrium loan size in the first
regime and decreases it in the second. Using out-of-sample of
evidence, we identify the two regimes in the data. We then find
that in the unconstrained regime political instability has a
significant positive effect on the loan size, whereas it has no
significant effect in the credit rationing regime. Hence the
evidence indicates a positive effect of political instability on
the demand for sovereign loans, as predicted by the theory.
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and NBER1. Introduction
A central unresolved question in the literature on sovereign borrowing is why some
developing countries accumulated so much external debt in the decade just preceding the
debt crisis ou1982. Most of the proposed answers have focused on the supply side of the
market fbr sovereign loans, emphasizing distorted incentives or irrational "herd behavior"
by the banks) But to date we don't know of any systematic analysis of the borrowers'
incentives. And yet, the costs of the debt crisis have been so harsh for several sovereign
borrowers that it is difficult to reconcile their large-scale borrowing with ex—ante
optimality. En this paper we attempt to answer this question by studying the incentives to
borrow created by domestic political institutions. Our findings suggest that political
instability has an important role in explaining the observed accumulation of external debt
during the period 1972—81. As predicted by our theoretical analysis, the larger debts have
been accumulated by the more unstable countris.
The first part of the paper considers a simple two-period model of sovereign
borrowing. The model combines two important features of international borrowing:
1) A sovereign borrower cannot commit to repay its external debt, but suffers from
external sanctions if it defaults. 2) A moral hazard problem is present since a sovereign
borrower cannot commit to invest (rather than consume) the proceeds of its borrowing. In
theborrowingcountry there are different policymakers that randomly alternate in office,
and prefer different compositions of theavailablepublic goods. Thus, the model captures
two features of a political system: political instability and political polarization. Political
instability is the probability of losing the office. Political polarization is the extent of
disagreement over the composition of public goods. Higher instability and polarization
lead to a stronger preference for present, as opposed to future, government consumption.
The question addressed in the paper is how this affects the equilibrium amount borrowed.
Most of the analysis focuses on two equilibrium regimes: (I) An equilibrium without
credit rationing, but in which moral hazard imposes a binding incentive constraint on the2
equilibrium loan contract (called the moral hazard regime)and (ii) An equilibriumwhere
the borrower is credit constrained (called the credit rationing regime). The model predicts
that higher political instability and polarization lead to larger equilibrium loans in the
moral hazard regime, but not in the credit rationing regime. Intuitively, more instability
and polarization make the borrower more myopic, thus increasing his demand for loans and
reducing his willingness to invest. In the moral hazard regime, the larger loan demand is
accommodated and hence the equilibrium amount borrowed increases. But in the credit
rationing regime, the smaller investment makes the credit constraint more binding, and
hence the equilibrium loan size diminishes as instability and polarization increase.
The rest of the paper investigates whether this prediction of the model is consistent
with the evidence. The available data are a panel for 55 mostly developing countries
during the years 1972-1981, a period of rapid debt accumulation. The dependent variable
is the new loans made from Eurocurrency loan markets by each country in each year. A
feature of the data is that each country has not borrowed every year (either because it was
credit constrained or because it did not want to).
In carrying out the empirical investigation we face two problems. First, to estimate
the model we need to identify the two equilibrium regimes (moral hazard and credit
rationing). To do that we rely on out of sample information concerning a country's
repayment difficulties.
The second problem concerns the measurement of the political variables. The
conceptual definition of political instability relevant for our work is the probability of an
imminent government change.Following the method of Cukierman, Edwards and
Tabellini (1990),weestimate yearly measures of political instability for each country over
the period 1972—1981. This measure of political instability is quite variable over time for a
large number of countries in our sample and it tracks down the actual government change3
quite well.Political polarization, which is more difficult to measure, is primarily captured
bytheyearly frequency of various forms of political expression: nots,executions,etc.
Theempirical findings are remarkably consistent with the predictions of the theory.
Political instability has an important positive impact on external borrowing in the moral
hazard regime. But we could not find any effect of political instability on loan size in the
credit rationing regime. The empirical results concerning the effect of political polarization
on the amounts borrowed are ambiguous, possibly because of our difficulties in correctly
measuring polarization. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates the
theoretical model; Section 3 addresses empirical issues, including the data, estimation
method and results. A summary of our findings and concluding remarks are in Section 4.
2. The Theory
This section outlines a simple two-period model of international borrowing and lending
that will guide us in the empirical investigation. The elements of the political system are
as in Alesina and Tabellini (1989),Tabelliniand Alesina (1990). The typical sovereign
borrower is the government of a country with the following political features. Two possible
policymaker types, L and R, randomly alternate in office. The policymaker of type i
maximizes:
+EIt(g21f2) (1)
whereand f denote the period t consumption of two different (public) goods, such as4
bridgesand weapons, U(.)isa well-behavedconcave utility function, E is the expectations
operator, and #(.)isdefined as follows.IfI =L,then
=
a(l-a)Min[ag, (1-a)!] ,1.>a>O (2)
andif I =it,then HR(.) is defined as in (2),but with areplaced by(1-a). Thus,these
twopolicyniakerstypes prefer different compositionsof thegoods g and fForsimplicity,
their disagreement is parameterized by a. The more distant is a from 1/2, the more they
disagree. Irrespective of who holds office in period 1, there is a given probability (i-'') of
being reappointed in period 2; with probability 7, the other policymaker type will be
reappointed.2
In the model, then, the political system has two central features: its instability,
represented by the probability of losing office, 7. And the degree of nolarization between
the alternating governments, represented by the parameter a. As shown below, these two
features determine the demand for sovereign loans.
Before studying the borrowing decision, let us rewrite the government objective
function in a more convenient form. For concretens, suppose a>1/2, and define z =g+f
as the total amount of government spending. Clearly, if /andfdenotethe consumption
of g and f when thepolicymaker is in office, I =R,L,then:
L(1) ()
Thevalue of the function H(g,f) depends on whether the policyrnaker of type I is in office5
ornot. By substitution of (3) in (2), when i holds office,
1?(gf)=z, i=R,L (4a)
andwhen hedoes nothold office,
fft(5f) = 1-az, i =R,L (4b)
Since a> 1/2, the right hand side of (4b) is smaller than that of (4a). Thus, as intuitive,
both policymaler types achieve a higher utility when they are in office, since they then
choose the preferred composition of public spending.
By assumption, both policymaker types face the same probability (1-7) of retaining
office in period 2. Irrespective of who holds office in period 1, by substitution of (4) into
(1), we can then write the sovereign borrower expected utility function as:
14z1)+5('ta)Ex2 (5)
whereS(ta)(1-y) +y(1-a)/ac1,and E is the expectations operator (now with
respect to uncertainty other than about who is appointed next period).
Note that 71 ta < 0 (a subscript denotes a partial derivative). Thus, equation (5)
summarizes a central result, studied more extensively in Tabellini and Alesina (1990)and
Alesina and Tabellini (1990). More political instability (a higher 7)andmore political
polarization (a higher a) lead to a stronger preference for present relative to future
government consumption.That is, political instability and polarization lead to
government myopia.6
Wenow complete the description of the economic environment. Lenders are risk
neutral and competitive. They are willing to lend to sovereign borrowers up to the point
where the (gross) expected rate of return on their loans is equal to the given risk-free rate,
r? 1. Lenders face a large number of sovereign borrowers.
The rest of the model combines two features that have been studied separately in
the literature on sovereign borrowing. The first feature is sovereign risk: a sovereign
borrower cannot commit to repay its external debt. To name but a few examples, Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoff (1989 a,b), Grossman and Van Buyck (1988) have
examined the role of reputation and external sanctions in sustaining sovereign debt
repayments.For simplicity, as in Cohen and Sachs (1987), Erugman (1985) and
Ozler (1989), we assume that if a borrower defaults, he suffers from external sanctions that
result in the loss of a fraction q <Iof its second period output. The lender only recovers a
fraction A <1of the loss incurred by the borrower)
The second feature of our model is moral hazard: a sovereign borrower cannot
commit to invest (rather than consume) the proceeds of its borrowings. Hence, the loan
conditions cannot be contingent on investment. Our formalization of this second feature
follows Gertler and Rogoff (1989). Second period output, y, is random, and can take one of
two fixed values:orcji, with probability r and 1-r respectively. The only role of
investment, k,isto increase the probability that the good state occurs. Specifically, we
assume that r =P(k,O) where1? is a parameter known to everybody that refers to the
economic structure and determines the riskiness of investment in this country: the greater
is U, the more likely is the good state y =j.Thus:
k>°' PcO, Pk$>O (6)7
where a subscript denotes a partial derivative.
Events unfold according to the following timing:
In the first period, the policymaker contracts a loan. The loan specifies an amount 6
borrowed today,and a (gross)interest rate ft ￿ rtobe repaid tomorrow with the
principal.
• Then, the borrower decides how much to invest and consume in the current period.
• At the beginning of the second period, the policymaker in the borrowing country is
either reappointed or thrown out of office.
• Next, the appointed government in the borrowing country decides whether to repay
the amount due, or to suffer the penalty, qy.
Based on these assumptions, the borrower's budget constraints are:
+ 11 + k ￿ in + 6
(7) + =Max(y-Rb,(1-q)j4
where wdenotesa given first period endowment.
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium loan contract.
2.1. flUnconstrainedReçime
This subsection characterizes the equilibrium in the event that the incentive
constraints due to moral hazard and sovereign risk are not binding. For this case to occur,
the equilibrium amount borrowed must be sufficiently small that it is always repaid in full,
irrespective of the state of the world. If this is so, then the interest rate on the loan carries
no spread over the risk-free rate: ft =it
Let6* and 1tdenotethe equilibrium amounts borrowed and invested. They are8
determined by the following optimality conditions:4
P(k*,O)[yyJ=r (Ba)
U1(w+6*_k*) =Sr (8b)
where (J denotes the derivative of (4.).Equation(8a) equates the marginal product of
investment to the risk-free rate. Equation (8b) is the familiar Euler's equation for the
optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption, given the policymakers discount rate S.
Hence, investment is carried out up to the point where its marginal product equals its
opportunity cost. And consumption is also allocated optimally, given the preferences.
For this to be an equilibrium, 6* must satisfy 6* q/rso that it is in the interest of
the borrower to always repay its debt, rather than suffer the penalty associated with
default.5 Under this condition, no incentive constraint is binding, and the equilibrium loan
contract can be written so as to achieve full efficiency between the borrowers and the
lenders.
2.2. Moral Hazard
Next, suppose that the equilibrium level of debt is such that the borrower repays in
full only if the good state occurs. Otherwise, the borrower suffers a loss q, and the lender
recovers the amount Aq. The zero expected profit condition for the lender then implies
thattheinterest rate on the loan is:
(9)
Heremoral hazard imposes a binding incentive constraint on the equilibrium loan contract.
-A9
Theborrower cannot commit to an investment policy. Hence, the terms of the loan cannot
be made contingent on investment. But the probability of default depends on investment.
Hence, the borrower is prevented from taking into account the beneficial effects of
investment on its cost of borrowing. Thisresultsin an insufficient amount invested
compared to the unconstrained equilibrium.
Specifically, now investment is chosen so as to maximize (5), subject to (6) and (7)
(butnot (9), since w is taken as given because of the moral hazard constraint). After some
simplifications, we obtain that the equilibrium amount invested is determined by:
-k(1Th_=r (10)
Theequilibrium size of the loan is still determined by (8b) from above (since the expected
marginal cost of borrowing is still equal to the risk-free rate r).Since by assumption
Rb* > qy, investment falls short of the efficient amount defined implicitly in (8a).'
For this to be an equilibrium, two conditions must be satisfied. First, if the bad
state occurs, debt must be repudiated; hence, b*qyJr(orFl in footnote S must be
violated). Second if the good state occurs, the debt must be repaid in full. Hence, Rbt < a
forR given by (9).? Making use of (9) we thus obtain the upper bound on 6*:
(11)
2.3Credit Rationing
If (11) holds as equality, then the borrower is credit constrained: he would not be
able to borrow more, even if he wished to do so. Now the opportunity cost of investing is10
themarginaldisutility of foregoing period 1 consumption, which, if the credit
constraint (11)isbinding, exceeds the risk-free rate.
Specifically investment is chosen so as to maximize (5), subject to (6) and (7), with
b= cf. (11). Equilibrium investment is then implicitly defined by:
_U(w+3_k*) + o(l_q)Pgk*,9)(j_) =0 (12)
where 6, defined in (11), is the maximum amount that can be borrowed. The equilibrium
interest rate on the loan contract is still defined by (9), with b =binit.
2.4 Discussion
Summarizing, we can identify three equilibrium regimes. (i) The unconstrained
equilibrium, in which 1? =r andinvestment and debt are determined by (8).(ii) The
equilibrium with moral hazard, in which ft is determined by (9), debt by (Sb), and
investment by (10).(iii) The equilibrium with credit rationing, in which ft is still given
by (9), debt is determined by (11),andinvestment by (12). These three regimes lead to
different comparative statics results and suggest different specifications of the regressions
that will be carried out in the empirical analysis.
For our empirical investigation we are interested in two regimes: the moral hazard
and the credit rationing regime. We can rule out a prioritheunconstrained regime, since
in the observed sample we always have ft >r theloans always carry a positive spread on
the LIBOR rate.
In both regimes, the equilibrium size of the loan, b, is a function of all the
parameters of the model:11
6 =B(6,w,r,q,A,r,y,O) (13)
But in the moral hazard regime, the function B(.) is defined implicitly by (Sb), (9) and
(10) whereas in the credit rationing regime B(.) is defined implicitly by (9), (11) and (12).
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain that in the moral hazard regime:
25< 0, B< 0, arc0,
(14a)
Bq0 B>O, B>0 20, B>O.
whereas in the credit rationinr refime:
Bo>O, B15>0) 2r<0
(14b)
BqO 2>0, B>0, B0, B>O.
Consider first the moral hazard regime, (14a). The general intuition here is that the
borrowing country is on its demand curve. Hence the equilibrium size of the loan reflects
(i) the position of this demand curve, and (ii) the marginal cost of borrowing as captured
by the interest rate R. The position of the demand curve for loans in turn depends on the
country rate of time preference, 5, on its period 1 endowment, w, and on the variables
detennining investment. The marginal cost of borrowing depends on the risk-free rate, r,
and on the riskiness of the country as determined by the equilibrium rate of investment.
In the credit rationing regime, on the other hand, the borrower is riot on his demand
curve. Hence the equilibrium size of the loan is determined by the perceived default risk,12
which in turn dependson the equilibriumsize of investment. Hence all the parameters
in (14) —exceptthe risk-free rate r— affectthe loan size indirectly, by determining the
country willingness to invest.
Note that the country rate of time preference, 6, has opposite effects on the loan size
in the two regimes. In the moral hazard regime, a higher S (i.e., a higher weight on future
consumption) reduces the equilibrium amount borrowed, since it shifts down the demand
for loans. In the credit rationing regime, on the other hand, a higher 6 has the opposite
effect: it increases the equilibrium size of the loan. The reason is that here a higher weight
to future consumption leads to more investment, and hence it relaxes the upper credit
constraint. As shown at the beginning of this section, the parameter S is a decreasing
function of political instability (7) and polarization (a). The model thus leads to the
prediction that more political instability and polarization is associated with larger loans in
the moral hazard regime, but smaller loans in the credit rationing regime.
Before tuning to the evidence, we dose this theoretical section with a remark on
the normative interpretation of these alternative regimes. From the point of view of a
policymaker who is already in office in period 1, the unconstrained regime is preferred to
any other, since no incentive constraint is binding. But from the point of view of a
policymaker who does not yet know whether he will be in office in period 1ornot, the
unconstrained regime may result in an excessively large loan (even though it results in the
optimal investment size). Hence from an ex—ante point of view, the moral hazard regime
or even the credit rationing regime may be preferred)
Generally, the welfare comparison between these three regimes is ambiguous and
depends on the parameter values: even though the moral hazard and credit rationing
regimes lead to smaller loans (which is ex—ante welfare improving), they also lead to
smaller investment (which is not). Hence no unambiguous normative ranking of these
regimes is possible in general.13
3.The Evidence
LiIheflaSa
Accordingto the theory formulated in the previous section, the loan size depends on five
main variables,each ofthem referring to a parameter of the model. Table 1 summarizes
how eachvariable affectstheloansize in both equilibrium regimes.
We now discuss how to measure each of these variables, as well as the dependent
variable. The deDendeat variable is the amount of new bus made in a year to each
country from Eurocurrency credit markets, in the period 1972-81 and for a sample of
55 developing countries.The loans included are USS—denominated loans that have
variable interest rates with LIBOR as the base rate. These restrictions are incorporated to
avoid complications that may arise from comparisons across different types of financial
instruments. The loan size is scaled by GDP arid is measured in logs, and it is denoted
AMNTY. An important feature of the loan data is that not every country in the sample
has borrowed new loans from these markets every year in the sample. Lack of borrowing in
a particular year could be either because of lack of demand for new loans or the borrower
may simply by rationed. This censoring problem is taken into account in the estimation.
Five groups of explanatory variables are used in the regressions.
(1)Political Instability
By political instability we mean the probability of an imminent government change,
as perceived by the incumbent. Our procedure for constructing a measure of such
probability extends that of Cukierruan, Edwards and Tabellini (1990) by introducing a
time variable measure. First, we estimate a probit model on pooled time series and
cross—country data, for a large sample of countries (larger than the 55 countries on which14
we haveloansdata) over the period 1957-82. The data contain annual observations on
governmentchange andotherpoliticaland economicevents. From these regressions we
construct two yearly measures of political instability for each country over the period
1972-81.They are the in-sample andout-of-sampleforecasts of the probability of a
government change. Thus, for each country we obtain two series of 12 yearly observations
of political instability, which we call INSTAB1 and INSTAB2. The in-sample forecast for
country i and year t (INSTAB1) is obtained by estimating the probit model up to and
including year 1, and then computing the expected probability of government change for
that year. The out-of-sample forecast for year t (INSTAB2) is obtained by estimating the
model up to year t-i, and then using the explanatory variables for year t to compute the
expected probability of government change for that year. Thus, we estimate 12 probit
regressions on pooled time-series and cross-country data, one for the period 1951—71, one
for 1951-72, and so on up to the period 1951—82.
The specifications of the probit regressions contain three broad classes of
explanatory variables: economic variables, designed to measure the recent economic
performance of the government; political variables, accounting for significant political
events that may signal the imminence of a crisis; and structural variables, accounting for
institutional differences and country-specific factors that do not change, or that change
only slowly over time. These structural variables consist of three dummy variables that
group countries in three categories, according to their political institutions: (i) democracies;
(ii) democracies in which the election date is determined by the constitution; and
(iii) democracies ruled by a single majoritarian party. Even though these three groups are
too broad to account for the variety of existing political institutions, at least they
discriminate between very different constitutional environments.Moreover, we have
included a dummy variable for each country, to allow for fixed effects across countries. All15
these variables,aswellastheirsource,are defined precisely in Table A.1 of the Apendix,
which also reports the results of three out of the twelve probit regressions. Table 2 reports
the mean and standard deviation of our two measures of political instability, for every
country in the sample, over the period 1972-81. They are quite similar to each other. The
last column of Table 2 reports the frequency of government change during the period
1972-81: it is not too dissimilar from the means of our two measures of political instability.
To get a sense for how variable our measures of political instability are over time,
we plotted both measures against time. To our surprise, we found them to be quite
variable for a large number of countries. We also found that the in-sample and
cut-of-sample expected probability measures move closely together over time, and they
track down the actual government change quite well. In the results reported below we use
the out-of-sample forecast (INSTAB2). But in subsection 3.4 we describe what happens
when the in—sample forecast is used instead.
(ii) Political Polarization
Political polarization is even more difficult to measure than political instability,
and we rely on several different and imperfect proxies. First, the intensity of political
conflict is presumably related to the broad nature of the political system and to the general
organization of social and economic interactions. To quantify the first variable we
constructed an indicator for democratic regimes (DEMOCRACY), taking a value of 1 if the
country is a democracy in that year, and 0 otherwise, whereas we measured the second
variable by the percentage of the population living in urban areas (URBAN). Presumably
totalitarian regimes are more likely in highly polarized societies, where democratic forms of
government would not be viable, and political conflicts are known to be more intense and
disruptive in urban communities in comparison to rural aieas.
Second we measure political polarization by relating it to the yearly frequency of16
various forms of political expressions such as riots, strikes, political assasinations. Since
there are a large number of potential variables in this category, we constructed summary
indicators using principal components analysis. The events that formed the basis of our
analysis are: political assassinations, aimed attacks, deaths due to political violence,
executions, political protests, political strikes, riots, government sanctions, regime support
demonstrations, and relaxation of government sanctions. Tables A.3 and A.4 of the
Appendix provide summary statistics for the three factors identified (and called FACTOR
i—a respectively). As is evident from the appendix, it is difficult to interpret the three
identified factors, which is a known weakness of this statistical approach. In subsection 3.4
below we report on results that aggregate these political events by taking simple averages.
The remaining variables are easier to measure. Specifically:
(iii)Current income is measured by real GDP per capita (GDPCAP).
(iv)The Denalty for defaulting is measured by two variables.The first is the
percentage of the borrower exports to the three largest aeditor nations (EXPRAT). This
variable measures the degree of vulnerability of the borrower to trade embargoes. The
second variable is the ratio of reserves to GDP (RESY). The presumption is that
borrowers with higher reserves are less likely to suffer credit embargoes, and hence bear a
smaller penalty for defaulting Hence, we expect the default penalty to be positively related
to EXPRAT and negatively related to RESY. As the available data does not allow us to
separately measure how much the lenders are likely to benefit from the costs they impose
on the defaulters, we do not have an empirical counterpart for the parameter A in the
model.
(v) The risk-free rate is measured by LIBOR (London Interbank offer rate).
(vi)The variability of future income is measured by two variables. The first is the
ratio of agriculture in GDP (AGGDP), as economies with larger agricultural sectors are17
more likely to be prone to output and terms of trade shocks. Second, we measure income
variability by the forecast error relative to a moving average of real GDP per capita over
the sample period (INCVAR).
Summary statistics of the dependent variableandof all explanatory variables for
both regimes are shown in Table 4.
12 SimMka Method
The theoretical model identifies two regimes, the moral hazard and credit rationing
regimes. In addition, the data are censored as positive levels of borrowing are not observed
every year for each cOuntry. Theoretically it is possible to write a likelihood function that
captures both features.The estimation, however, is cumbersome, even when the
complications that arise because of the censoring are put aside. Models with unknown
sample separation have two major problems.First, there is considerable loss of
information. Second, the likelihood function for this class of models is usually unbounded.
To overcome the problems that arise from the presence of two regimes we use out of
sample infonnation. The sample is split in two sub-samples with this information.9
Furthermore we assume that disturbances are independent and normal for the two regimes,
each of which has a censoring problem. Accordingly, we estimate the usual censoring
model separately for each regime using a maximum likelihood procedure.
The out-of-sample information used in the classification of countries is based on the
signing of IMF agreements.tO Specifically, we classify a country as credit rationed if in the
next period the country had an extended fund facility or a standby agreement with the
IMF, and not rationed otherwise (as will be discussed later, we considered some variation
of this approach so as to assess the sensitivity of the results to our classification). The
justification for this approach is that, typically, a country experiencing "repayment18
difficulties" does not have normal access to "new" loans from private creditors until an
IMF agreement. Table 3 presents summary information concerning the observations
classifiedinthecreditrationingregime using thisapproach.
3.3 Results
The primary result of our investigation is that political instability teads to larger
loans in the moral hazard regime, but it has no effect on borrowing in the credit rationing
regime. The estimation results that lead to this main finding are discussed in this section.
First, we estimate the model on the two regimes separately by simple OLS,
neglecting the censoring of the data. Table 5 reports the results. In the unconstrained
regime, political instability has a positive and statistically significant impact, as predicted
by the model. The parameter estimate of this variable and the related t value are 1.22 and
2.65 respectively. The parameter estimate for the instability variable in the credit
rationing regime is —.13. Though the sign is as predicted by the model, the estimate is not
statistically significantly different from zero.
Next, we reestimate the equations by maximum likelihood methods, now taking the
censoring problem into full account. The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7, for
different specifications. Consider Table 6 first. Columns (la) and (lb) only employ the
economic variables, as a base for comparison with the other specifications where political
instability and polarization are introduced. In both regimes all variables have the expected
sign, except for INCVAR which has the wrong sign in the credit rationing regime.
Moreover, several variables change sign across the two regimes, as predicted by our theory.
This is an indication that the sample separation criterion is correct. However the overall
fit of the equations seems better in the moral hazard regime, where the estimated
coefficients on 3 out of 6 variables are significantly different from zero (they are EXPRAT
and RESY, that refer to the default penalty, and AGGDP that refers to the variability of19
future income).In the credit rationing regime only the variable EXPRAT has a
statistically significant estimated coefficient.
Columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 6 add our measure of political instability.Its
estimated coefficient is positive in the moral hazard regime and negative in the credit
rationing regime, as predicted by our theory.However, the estimated coefficient is
significantly different from zero in the moral hazard regime but not in the credit rationing
regime. The other estimated coefficients are virtually unaffected by the inclusion of this
variable in both regimes.LL
Finally, Table 7 adds our measures of polarization, first including only the variables
DEMOCRACY and URBAN, and then adding the three FACTORS. The estimated
coefficients of the economic variables and of political instability remain generally like in
Table 6. In particular, political instability retains its positive and significant estimated
coefficient in the moral hazard regime but not in the credit rationing regime. The variables
DEMOCRACY and URBAN have a positive estimated coefficient in both regimes (our
theory predicts a positive coefficient in the moral hazard regime and a negative coefficient
in the credit rationing regime). However the t—statistics drop considerably in the credit
rationing regime. The estimated coefficients on the three FACTORS are insignificantly
different from zero and, because of their ambiguous interpretation, their sign is not very
meaningful. Overall, therefore, our measures of political polarization do not have much
explanatory power, presumably because of errors of measurement.
The main inference that we draw from these estimates is that political instability is
positively associated with loan size in the moral hazard regime, but not in the credit
rationing regime. Thus the evidence supports our theory, and in particular the proposition
that political instability increases the loan demand of the borrower. However there is no
evidence of the predicted negative relationship between debt and political instability in the20
credit rationing regime.
The overall poor performance of the model in the credit rationing regime indicates
that our formulation of the penalties of defaulting may be too simplistic. In particular, the
theoretical predictions that less investment reduces the expected default cost and therefore
leads to tighter credit rationing would not arise from more general models that allow for an
effect of investment on the sectoral composition of output between traded and non-traded
goods.'2 Moreover, political variables could have an independent effect on the credit
constraint, if for instance the cost of default differs across political parties, as in Alesina
and Tabellini (1989).
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we report several results that indicate the robustness of the
estimates in Tables S—7.
(i) Snecification
First, we redefined the dependent variable by scaling it to GDP and by population,
rather than exports. The results are analogous to those of Table 7. Second, we added
another variable capturing the costs of default, namely the share of exports plus imports
over GDP, in the hope that this would improve the performance in the credit rationing
regime.This new variable was generally insignificant and did not affect the other
estimated coefficients. Finally, to allow for fixed effects in our panel, we added a list of
dummy variables, one for each year between 1972-81, plus five regional dummies that
grouped countries in the same geographic area. A few of these dommy variables were
significant, but none of the other estimated coefficients were affected.In particular,
political instability always retained its positive and significant estimated coefficient in the
moral hazard regime, and its negative and insignificant coefficient in the credit rationing21
regime.
(ii) Errors in Variables
Our measures of political instability and polarization are likely to be measured
with error. To assess the robustness of our results, we replaced them with other, slightly
different, measures. The out-of-sample forecast of the probability of a government change,
INSTAB2, was replaced by the in-sample forecast, INSTAB1. And we replaced the three
FACTORS by other measures of polarization, obtained by aggregating together the
frequency of similar political events, to form four variables: political challenges to the
regime, violent challenges to the regime, unsuccessful attempts of regime change, and
political repressions. The variable INSTAB1 performed analogously to INSTAR2. And
none of these four polarization variables ever had a significant estimated coefficient.
(iii)Sample Separation
The results reported in the text use as a criterion for sample separation whether the
country signed an IMF standby-extended facility agreement in the subsequent year. To
check the robustness of the results, we replaced this criterion with two other ones. First,
we looked at whether the country signed the IMF agreements in the current year or not.
Second, we incorporated information on bank reschedulings. The results did not change
substantially, and in particular the political instability variable had a positive and
significant estimated coefficient in the moral hazard regime, and an insignificant and
negative coefficient in the credit rationing regime. This finding is reassuring because it
suggests that the results are robust to small redefinitions of the samples. Furthermore, a
likelihood ratio test cannot reject the nul hypothesis that the moral hazard and the credit
rationing samples correspond to two different regimes.
(iv)Simultaneity
In principle the political instability variable could be correlated with the error term,22
since large external borrowing could affect the probability of government change. Dealing
with this problem in a satisfactory way would require joint estimation of the probit
equations and the borrowing equations. We did not try it, because of the computational
difficulties, but we strongly doubt that the data contain enough information to obtain
reliable inferences from such a non-linear problem.
What we tried instead was simply to replace the current value of the instability
index with its one-period legged value. The results were generally unchanged, even though
the t-statistic on political instability dropped slightly in the moral hazaid regime. This
provides some indication that reverse causation is not driving our results.
5.ConcludingRemarks
The central result of this paper is that domestic political instability increases the
demand of sovereign borrowing. This result is derived theoretically from a simple model,
and receives support from the evidence concerning Eurocurrency loans of developing
countries during 1972-81. This result can thus contribute to explain why some countries
accumulated so much external debt over a short period of history.
Sovereign borrowing entails two decisions: first to borrow and then to repay. In this
paper we have focused mainly on how political incentives affect the decision to borrow.
The repayment decision has been studied by several interesting recent papers,13 all of
which however have focused exdusively on the economic incentives to repay. Our
empirical findings and the worse performance of the empirical model in the credit rationing
regime suggests that an important direction for future research is to investigate how the
repayment decision is also affected by political incentives.'423
Footnotes
See Eaton and Taylor (1986) for a review.
2 Thesesimplifying assumptions can be relaxed in several ways. All the results hold
if the political process is modelled as in Alesina and Tabellini (1990),whererational voters
elect the policymaker; wider appropriate assumptions, the results also generalize toa
concave function It(.); similarly, the symmetry of the model is not important.
I Belowand Rogoff (1989a) discuss how to derive this assumption from an explicit
model of debt rescheduling. In a finite horizon model such as this one, reputation cannot
create any incentive for repayment. Below and Regoff (1989b) discuss why even in an
infinite horizon framework reputation does not create strong incentives for repayment.
4 Equations(8a) and (8b) are the first order conditions of the problem of maximizing
(5) with respect to k and 6, subject to (7), (6) and for R=r.
By (Sb), 6* ￿ tjrif and only if:
_U(w+qvJrk*) ÷ ör￿O
where kt is determined by (8a).
Using (9), equation (10) can be rewritten as:
-(rrqA+P(k*,(1_A))]P(k*,e)/P(k*,O) =r
7 Inequality(11) holds if
UJw4q(rjL1(1r)A2)/r.k*] ￿ Er.
If the uncertainty about who wili be in office in period I is the same as the
uncertainty about who will be appointed in period 2, the ex—ante optimal policy is to
invest according to (Ba), but to borrow so as to satisfy:
U2(w+6*r) =r.
SeeTabellini and Alesina (1990) for a more extensive discussion of this point.
a This approach does not take into account the problems that may arise from the
presence of stochastic upper bounds, which would require numerical optimization methods.
10 Anapproach taken in Hajivassiliou (1987).
11 SinceJNSTABQ is a fitted variable, the estimated standard error of its coefficient is
biased. However, as shown by Pagan (1984), under the null hypothesis that its true
coefficient is zero, the bias disappears. Hence, the t-statistics of INSTAB2 is still a correct
Lagrange multiplier test of the null. The t—statistics of the other variables, on the other
hand, are biased.
12 Seefor instance Gersovitz (1983), Kahn (1984) and Alexander (1987).
13 Forinstance Below and Rogoff (1989a), Grossman and van Huyk (1988) and Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981).
14 Diwanand Verdier (1990) have taken a step in this direction. They empirically
show that repayment behavior in democracies is better explained by economic variables
than in totalitarian regimes.24,.
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Table A.! defines the explanatory variables used in the Probit Regressions.
Table A.2 reports three out of the twelve regressions that we ran. The remaining
regressions have similar patterns. The coefficients are quite stable across the estimation
periods. Most variables have the expected sign, even though only a few are significant. In
particular, government change is made more likely by unusual inflation in the previous
year (but the opposite is true for inflation in the previous two years), and by unusually low
growth of private consumption over the current and previous two years. (As explained in
Table A.2, these variables are measured in deviation from their country means.) Moreover,
RIOTS, POLITICAL REPRESSIONS, EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENTS and unsuccessful
attempts to change the government (ATTEMPTS) all signal the imminence ofa political
crisis. Two of the institutional dummies are significant: democracies have more frequent
government changes than non—democratic regimes. And coalition governments or minority
governments are less stable than inajoritarian governments. Several of the country-specific
dummies (not reported in the table) are also significant, indicating that there are
additional factors contributing to instability of the political system which are not fully
captured by our explanatory variables. These estimates are robust to changes in the model
specification.
2. Measures of Dolitica] Dolarization
To construct the three FACTORS used to measure political polarization, we applied
principal component analysis on the yearly frequency of the events listed in the text.
Table A.3 contains the simple correlation matrix of these variables, and Table A.4 provides
summary statistics for the three factors identified.27
3. Data Sources
The political event data are all taken from Jodice and Taylor (1983). Real per
capita GDP comes from Summers and fleston (1988). Urbanization and GDP of the
agricultural sector is taken from The World Development Report, The World Bank,
variousyears.Exports, imports, reserves, LIBOR, are obtained from the IMF,
International Financial Statistics. Loan amount data are collected from Euromoney on a
contractual basis. (For more details see Ozler (1991).)Table 1
TheDeterminants of Soyerágn Loans
Moral Credit
Variable Razard* Rationing
Political instability (7) +
Political polaiization (a) +
Current Income (w) +
Penalty for defaulting (q) +
Variability of income (0) +
*Thesigns refer to the partial derivatives of these variables on the equilibrium loan size, as
determined by (Na), (14b) above.Table 2
Measurof Political Instability
IN- OUT—OF OBSERVED
Country SAMPLE (SE)SAMPLE (SE) FREQUENCY
Algeria .105 .010 .105 .012. .167
Argentina .373 .062 .359 .061 .583 Bolivia .510 .058 .509 .057 .500 Brat! .234 .010 .222 .011 .250
Cameroon .0004 .0034 .0005 .0001 .083
Chile .256 .093 .291 .102 .083
Colombia .282 .014 .278 .020 .250
Congo, Peoples Rep. .190 .027 .206 .034 .167
Costa Rica .215 .020 .206 .019 .250
Ecuador .349 .034 .361 .036 .250
El Salvador .295 .024 .288 .022 .333
Ethiopia .156 .059 .155 .053 .083
FiJi .271 .017 .280 .021 .083
Gabon .170 .017 .183 .022 0
Ghana .296 .029 .288 .025 .333
Greece .492 .061 .471 .059 .500
Guatemala .208 .020 .199 .016 .250
Guyana .232 .108 .247 .023 .083
Honduras .277 .020 .266 .017 .417
India .201 .036 .188 .033 .417
Indonesia .054 .004 .055 .004 0
Iran .450 .097 .509 .105 .417
Ivory Coast .074 .008 .085 .013 0
Jamaica .151 .012 .151 .012 .167
Kenya .128 .017 .135 .017 .167
Liberia .101 .029 .076 .021 .167
Madagascar .175 .020 .167 .029 .333
Malawi .121 .018 .146 .026 0
Mauritania .054 .023 .039 .019 .333
Mauritius .006 .005 .001 .0001 .083
Mexico .072 .008 .065 .006 .167
Morocco .389 .037 .408 .047 .167
New Zealand .134 .016 .124 .019 .250
Nicaragua .241 .034 .242 .029 .167
Niger .048 .011 .042 .012 .083
Nigeria .075 .014 .063 .012 .250
Pakistan .324 .068 .331 .072 .250
Panama .200 .020 .202 .027 .167
Papua New Guinea .030 .029 .108 .053 .250
Paraguay .040 .007 .049 .010 0Tale 2 (continued)








Peru .429 .039 .440 .041 .250


























Sri Lanka .273 .031 .279 .034 .250
Sudan .431 .039 .443 .042 .250
Thailand .414 .035 .408 .032 .500
Trinidad & Tobago .049 .016 .035 .012 .250
Turkey .429 .079 .316 .071 .667
Uruguay .622 .047 .655 .044 .333
Venezuela .197 .009 .214 .009 .167
Zaire .248 .031 .299 .051 .083
Zambia .007 .005 .003 .003 .083
lii&: Means and standard errors of probabilities of government change, estimated from
probit regressions (both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions) and actually observed
frequency of government change.



















Jamaica 1972, 76—78 80—81)



















Sudan 1972, 73, 78)
Zambia 1980—81)
Fiji 1973)
A country was considered credit rationed if a high tranche IMF
agreement was signed in the following year.Table 4A
Sample Characteristics
Moral Hazard Regime
Zero Borrowing Positive Borrowing
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
AMNTE 0 0 .14 .14
GDPCAP 1.87 1.66 2.79 1.72
LIBOR 9.27 3.37 10.22 3.14
EXPR.AT .44 .14 .43 .14
RESY .09 .12 .07 .08
AGGDP 22.68 16.24 15.95 10.58
INCYAR 1.85 1.62 2.75 1.84
INSTAB1 .19 .18 .22 .18
INSTAB2 .18 .17 .20 .17
DEMOCRACY .52 .50 .55 .49
URBAN .32 .23 .46 .22
FACTOR 1 —.11 .47 .19 1.49
FACTOR 2 .04 .48 -.17 1.01
FACTOR 3 -.01 .28 -.07 .37
NOBS 200 215Table 48
Sample Cbaiactaietic
Credit Rationing Regime
Zero Borrowing Positive Borrowing
Mean Std. Dev. Mean SW. Dev.
AMNTE 0.17 0.27
GDPCAP 1.31 .89 2.09 1.16
MOOR 9.95 3.22 10.38 3.41
EXPR.AT .44 .18 .43 .16
RESY .05 .05 .04 .03
AGGDP 20.28 11.98 19.63 10.13
INCVAR 1.34 .85 2.12 1.33
INSTAB1 .24 .20 .30 .21
INSTAB2 .23 .22 .27 .21
DEMOCRACY .53 .50 .79 .40
URBAN .31 .19 .41 .21
FACTOR 1 -.10 .55 .43 .16
FACTOR 2 -.05 .22 .04 .80
FACTOR 3 .08 .74 .07 .91
NODS 54 69Table 5
OLS estimation
Denendent variable: AMNTE

















FACTOR 1 -.09 -.18
(-.56) (-.84)
FACTOR 2 -.01 -.13
(-.20) (-.45)








Note: Numbersintheparenthesisare 't' values.




Moral Credit Moral Credit
Hazard Rationing Hazard Rationing
Constant —2.37 —4.05 -2.82 —4.00
(-2.88) (-1.96) (-3.38) (-1.94)
GDPCAP -.3S .10 -.03 .02
(-.30) (.04) (-.25) (.09)
LIBOR -.07 -.06 -.01 -.04
(—.25) (-.10) (—.05) (-.07)
EXPRAT 1.40 2.45 1.63 2.78
(2.50) (2.68) (3.03) (2.31)
RESY —4.81 5.06 -4.58 5.12
(—4.17) (1.16) (—4.13) (1.14)
AGGDP —.02 —.01 -.02 —.01
(-2.16) (-.55) (-2.29) (-.54)
INCVAR .05 .22 .04 .27
(.49) (1.25) (.36) (1.41)
INSTAB2 1.14 -.52
(2.82) (—.43)
LL -331 —101 —328 —101
NOBS 415 123 415 123Table 7
Maximum LikelihOOd Estimation
DeDendent variable: AMNTE
Moral Credit Moral Credit
Hazard Rationing Hazard Rationing
Constant -3A4 —4.40 -3.28 -4.32
(-4.12) (-2.22) (—3.94) (-2.20)
GDPCAF —.12 —.10 -.11 -.07
(—1.0) (-.26) (—.92) (-.20)
LIBOR —.01 -.02 -.06 -.11
(-0.02) (-0.04) (-.25) (-.21)
EXPRAT 1.94 2.65 1.86 2.57
(3.52) (2.17) (3.41) (2.08)
RESY -4.29 6.16 -4.47 5.91
(-4.86) (1.23) (—5.0) (1.19)
AGGDP -.02 -.01 —.01 -.01
(—2.11) (—.49) (—2.91) (—.39)
INC VAR .04 .22 .001 .23
(.06) (.99) (.10) (1.03)
INSTAB2 1.06 -.40 1.39 -.19
(2.51) (-.32) (2.63) (-.15)
DEMOCRACY .19 .13 .15 .13
(1.02) (.33) (.83) (.32)
URBAN 1.45 1.37 1.32 1.38
(3.36) (1.07) (2.99) (1.11)
FACTOR 1 -.05 -.17
(-.42) (—.55)
FACTOR 2 .05 -.09
(.25) (-.33)
FACTOR 3 -.38 .09
(-1.09) (.08)
LL -320 -99 -328 -98
NOBS 415 123 415 123TableA.1
Variable Defithtionz for Probit Estimation
1. Government Change
Government change =Dummyvariable taking a value of 1 for the years in
which there is either a coup or a regular government transfer, and a value of 0
otherwise. ISource: Taylor—Jodice (1983)].
2. Economic Performance
Inflation =Annualrate of growth of GDP deflator.[Source: Constructed
from Summers—Heston (1988)].
Consumption Growth =Cuinmulativerate of growth of private consumption
in the current and previous two years. [Source: Summers—Heston (1988)].
3. Political Events [(Source: Taylor—Jodice (1983)J.
ASSASS =Assassinations
ATTACK =ArmedAttacks













REPRESSIONS =Politicalexecutions and government imposed sanctions.
EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENTS =Changesin the compsition of the executive not
resulting in government transfers.ATTEMPTS =Unsuccessfulattempts to change the government, taking the
form of unsuccessful coups and unsuccessful government transfers.
YEARS =Yearsfrom previous government change
4. Structural Variables
GDP Per Capita in constant USS of 1975 =[Source:Summers—Heston (1988)].
DEMOCRACY =adummy variable taking a value of 1 for democracies and 0
otherwise. [Source: Banks, various volumes].
ELECTION =adummy variable taking a value of 1 if the election date is
determined by the constitution and 0 otherwise. [Source: Banks, various volumes].
MAJORITY =adummy variable taking a value of 1 (or presidential systems or
for parliamentary governments supported by a single majority party, and 0
otherwise. [Source: Banks, various volumes}.Table A.2
Probit Rressions
Dependent Variable: Government Change











Govt Change (Lagged Twice)
(.1251) (.1029) (.0905)












































































The variablesinflation, consumption growth, protests, riots and repretsions are all in deviation from
their country—.peciflc means computedby the lastyear ofthe repressions;thus,for therepresssion
truncated in 1911, the mean is computed for the period 1951—1971,andso on.Table A.2 (continued)
Probit Regrsiona
Dependent Variable: Government Change
Years 1951—71 1951—77 1951—82








































Standard error in parenthesis.
*denotessignificance at the 5% confidence level. **denotessignificance at the 1% confidence level.Table A.3
Partial Corrdationa: Political evaita




(4).27 .13 .42 1.00
(5).20 .50 .11 .061.00
(6).36 .36 .29 .004.33 1.00
(7).20 .30 .19 .11 .35 .641.00
(8).34 .30 .17 .10 .40 .74 .641.00
(9).32 .44 .40 .23 .28 .34 .44 .471.00
(10) .50 .42 .18 .38 .72 .82 .74 .55 1.00
Note: Columns(1-10) correspond to the following variables respectively:
ASSASS, ATTACK, DEATHDPV, EXCUTION, PROTEST, PSTRIKE,
RELAXSCT, RIOTAN, RPROTEST, SACTIONTable A.4
Factor Pattern Political evita
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
ASSASS 0.55 0.43 0.20
ATTACK 0.69 0.54 -0.25
DEATHDPV 0.54 0.60 -0.32
EXCTJTION 0.22 0.26 0.88
PROTEST 0.54 -0.02 -0.15
PSTRIKE 0.78 -0.33 -0.11
RELAXSCT 0.76 -0.42 0.05
RJOTAN 0.79 -0.40 0.06
RPROTEST 0.67 0.15 0.16
SACTION 0.89 —0.21 0.01
VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY EACH FACTOR
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
4.50 1.44 1.06